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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT							
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION							
3	JONES,) Case No. 3:19-cv-02087-B						
4	Plaintiff,) Dallas, Texas) January 15, 2020						
5	v.) 9:00 a.m.						
6	REALPAGE, INC.,) MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT) OF MOTION TO COMPEL						
7	Defendant.) INTERROGATORY RESPONSES AND) PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS [#79]						
8								
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.							
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DALLAS, TEXAS - JANUARY 15, 2020 - 8:58 A.M. 1 2 THE CLERK: All rise. THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. 3 4 MR. ST. GEORGE: Good morning, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: We are here in the matter of Diane D. Jones, individually and on behalf of herself and all others 6 7 similarly situated, versus RealPage, Inc. doing business as 8 LeasingDesk Screening. This is Civil Action 3:19-cv-2087-B. 9 And before the Court this morning, pursuant to the District 10 Court's order of reference of December 9th, is the Memorandum 11 of Law in Support of Motion to Compel Interrogatory Responses

Would the parties please make their appearances for the record?

so I have the parties' joint submission before me.

and Production of Documents, which has actually been narrowed,

MR. SOUMILAS: Your Honor, good morning. For the Plaintiff, my name is John Soumilas. This morning with me are my colleagues Amy Tabor and Donna Lee, also on behalf of the Plaintiff.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Timothy St. George for the Defendant. With me is my partner, Virginia Flynn.

THE COURT: All right. And if you'll give me just a moment to get my electronic file up.

(Pause.)

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THE COURT: For purposes of our hearing this morning, rather than have you make presentations from the podium, as is customary in Federal Court, I'm going to ask both sides to please remain seated. We are on the record. The proceedings are being recorded. But I've got questions for both sides. I think we can dispose of this matter more efficiently that way. I have set aside one hour for today's hearing. So I've got questions for both sides, and then I'll give you the opportunity to present anything else that you would like for me to consider before I make my ruling. And I will rule from the bench this morning.

All right. So I am going to start with the Defense. And Mr. St. George, will you be arguing on behalf of the Defendant?

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. In this district, there are a number of cases that have cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in *McLeod* for the proposition that it is the party who resists discovery that has the burden on the objections. Do you have any authority to the contrary?

MR. ST. GEORGE: The only authority to the contrary would be that there is some case law cited, including in Plaintiff's motion to compel, that the party propounding has to show that the information sought is proportional and relevant under Rule 26(b). Well, of course, a party is only

allowed to seek discovery relevant to the claims in the case. Regardless of the burden, we're happy to prove our point. But in terms of Rule 26, that is a limitation that applies to the propounding party.

THE COURT: Rule 26 doesn't expressly impose a burden on the party seeking discovery to show relevance, does it?

MR. ST. GEORGE: It says the discovery has to be relevant to a claim in defense of the case.

THE COURT: It says it has to be relevant, but who has the burden to establish lack of relevance on an objection?

MR. ST. GEORGE: We're happy to assume that burden.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're not contesting that the case law in our district that says -- if you'll give me just a moment, I can give you the case cite. There are a number of cases that cite it. (Pause.) All right. The case that I most often cite to is Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227

F.R.D. 475, 477, citing McLeod -- M-C-L-E-O-D -- Alexander

Powel & Apffel, A-P-F-F-E-L, P.C. v. Quarles, Q-U-A-R-L-E-S, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990). And there are a number of cases, again, that cite that Fifth Circuit case for the proposition that the party who opposes its opponent's requests, discovery requests, must show specifically how each request is not relevant or how each request is overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive. So, we're going to go with that.

All right. Just to be sure that I didn't miss anything:

In reviewing the appendix in support of the joint submission,

I did not see an affidavit to support any objections. Did I

miss one?

MR. ST. GEORGE: There's no affidavit. The issues here are facial with respect to the requests. We did mention that we have exchanged information regarding the quantification, the quantity of reports that would be issued. I asked in the submission that we be allowed to present that — they're verified interrogatory responses. Asked in the submission we be allowed to present those for in camera review because they are highly confidential, and they provide some context for the volume of data that has been requested. Those interrogatories were served in this case back in June, but they would provide the Court was some insight into the volume of data that's being requested. But that is specific to the requests for production, —

THE COURT: Well, --

MR. ST. GEORGE: -- not the interrogatories.

THE COURT: I remember seeing that in a footnote. I don't remember specifically which footnote. Do you remember which footnote number that was? And I remember you saying you could submit it if I wanted.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right.

THE COURT: But since it is your burden and I'm going to be ruling today, my understanding of the case law is that

it should have been submitted if you wanted me to have considered it *in camera* prior to determination.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Well, we are happy to submit it.

THE COURT: Too late. We're here at the hearing. I'm ruling today.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Understood. Understood. We mentioned that it would be submitted upon invitation. But these numbers aren't going to be disputed in terms of the volume of data.

But there's no affidavit. Again, the issues here are largely facial with respect to the requests themselves and the lack of relevance, tailoring, any tailoring, as well as the obvious concerns that would arise with respect to a production of hundreds of thousands of reports with highly confidential consumer information in them.

THE COURT: Can you move the microphone a little closer to you?

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, as I understood the issues remaining, and I'm glad that the parties were able to resolve some of the issues, what we've got left is Interrogatory #15. Maybe. I'll ask about that.

Interrogatories 16 and 17. And while there was a reference to

Requests for Production Numbers 2 and 3, only #2 was specifically addressed in the joint submission. So, did I miss any issues?

MR. ST. GEORGE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did I miss any issues?

MR. SOUMILAS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So let's talk about 15. Did the Defendant supplement its response by January 8th, as represented in the joint submission?

MR. ST. GEORGE: So, we were -- we have not. We were prepared to do that, and to put -- we actually had that in the agreed order that we were going to submit to the Court, but it was removed by the Plaintiff's counsel and they did not want to include it. We are certainly prepared to supplement that information, but we haven't done it yet because we're not sure what issue remains and why we're here on that point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ST. GEORGE: If there's some reason why our proposed supplementations, the timeline or the pledge, is not sufficient, we wanted to hash that out with the Court today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ST. GEORGE: But from our opinion, there is no substantive dispute remaining on this interrogatory. And that is the interrogatory that is actually tailored to the class definition, --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ST. GEORGE: -- which is why we have promised to respond and will respond. I do have preliminary data from the client, and we should be able to make a response next week, assuming that there is nothing further, apart from responding.

Again, without posturing, we're not really sure why that dispute was -- was insisted on being included for today.

THE COURT: Well, as I read the joint submission -- I don't know. The Plaintiff will tell me in a minute. But as I read it, there were going to be two answers -- the current answer is none, --

MR. ST. GEORGE: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- and either you were going to produce something or say, We can't get it because there's no way to find it through a "automatic query" --

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right.

THE COURT: -- of records.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right.

THE COURT: So, to the extent that the Defendant was going to say, We can't get it, --

MR. ST. GEORGE: That isn't --

THE COURT: -- that would be a reason to be here.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right. And that is, based on the preliminary data that I've seen back from the client, that is not going to be the response. The response, based on the work

we've done over the holiday, will be a substantive response to the interrogatory.

The answer was none because there was some confusion from a definitional perspective. That was resolved in the meet-and-confer process, and this is now underway and will be supplemented.

THE COURT: Okay. So, does that address the Plaintiff's concern on 15?

MR. SOUMILAS: So, Your Honor, the reason -- the answer is no. The reason why 15 is still at issue are -- there are two reasons. One, there is a scheduling order in this case, Your Honor, where we must meet certain deadlines, including a certification motion by mid-April. So, without a firm date, which we still don't have, or any data as to when it would be coming, who will verify this interrogatory, whether we'll get a shot to depose that person to test it, we can't just put it in an agreed order and then not get it in time.

THE COURT: Well, isn't that what we're here for? I will set a deadline. First, we need to resolve the issues and objections. So, I will impose a deadline by which any response must be made. But as far as the substance of his response, given that he has now informed the Court that there will be a substantive response, would that -- does that address the issue that was raised in the joint submission?

MR. SOUMILAS: So, the answer to that question is yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SOUMILAS: That's why we raised it as an issue, because we want a substantive response within a time frame that we could work with with the Court's order. And assuming we get that, then that will resolve 15.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's move on to 15. I mean, 16 and 17. As I understand the issue that's presented, these interrogatories ask for information regarding subsets of the class that's identified in the amended complaint, but these were not identified as subclasses within the amended complaint.

MR. SOUMILAS: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. And the case law that you provided me didn't specifically address the issue of discovery, pre-certification discovery concerning subclasses that were not identified.

MR. SOUMILAS: I don't know that we've cited a case directly on that point, Your Honor, or that there is one. However, in -- there are a couple of issues there. One is that discovery under Rule 23 is governed by material that could lead to admissible evidence, and certainly this could lead to admissible evidence regardless of how a particular complaint frames the class definition or a subclass.

Secondly, in class action practice, it is not the definition in the complaint that governs. You frame your definition at certification based on what the evidence shows. And certainly we are not looking to get evidence beyond the complaint. So this is not some new theory. This is a more refined version of the same theory.

And if I might, Your Honor, just so that the Court is fully aware of what we're doing here: We're looking for non-matches, like Ms. Jones' case, where a criminal record does not match the tenant applicant, even though it's on the applicant's report. In the case of Ms. Jones, it was a criminal record for a Toni Taylor, who has an alias of Tina Jones. The year of birth of the two women is the same, but not the date of birth.

Therefore, in trying to identify non-matches, the broadest possible category is people whose criminal records doesn't match because of their name. A subcategory is neither the name nor the specific date of birth match. That's not a broader category. It's a narrower, more refined category, and frankly, we think one that has a much stronger inference to be made that the record just belongs to a completely different person, when we don't even have -- we have neither a name nor a date of birth.

So, in our view, the date of birth interrogatories at 16 and 17 are simply a subset that could fit the definition of

this case. I don't know that it will be a subclass, Your Honor. It could be the only class we move to certify. It depends on what the data looks like, what the numbers look like, how we could test their validity and so forth. But in our view, it's clearly within the Rule -- the ambit of Rule 26.

And one final point there, Your Honor, is that we took the Interrogatories 16 and 17 as a -- as an option in relation to Request for Production 2. In other words, if they don't want to do those searches for us, we think we could do them ourselves. We know we could do them ourselves. We have -- now that we have the format that these documents are in, we know that we could do them. So our view would be that they should either answer those or give us the documents so that we could get at the number of consumers who have not only a name not matching precisely but also a date of birth that is not a precise match.

So I think, Your Honor, our view is that it's a subset, a more narrowly-tailored subset, and a highly relevant one here that could be admissible.

THE COURT: All right. So I did my own research, since the parties didn't give me anything, any case law on point or that was close to it, or really, any legal argument other than it's not relevant and contact information -- discovery that asks for contact information isn't fatal. So I

found one case out of the Northern District of California from last year. A-I-I-R-A-M, LLC v. KB Home, 2019 WL 2896785, at *3, where the Court noted that several of the discovery requests sought to identify members of the putative class and subclass, and it says how many members of any -- each class or subclass had, noted that the courts generally permitted the discovery, noted that the discovery requests appeared to incorporate the class and subclass definitions of the amended complaint, and found that, under the circumstances, it concluded that, absent a more substantial showing, plaintiffs may only obtain class-related discovery that is strictly commensurate with their class and subclass definitions and necessary to a determination of the existence, size, and membership of the class and subclass, as set forth below.

So the Court was looking specifically at the definition of the class and any subclasses. There's not any -- there aren't any identified here. You've just got one class.

There was a case out of the Eastern District of Louisiana which was very general, *Melder v. Allstate Corporation*, 2007 WL 9777975. In ruling on relevance disputes and the limited scope of discovery imposed by the case management order, I must consider the definitions of the class and subclass proposed by plaintiffs in their class certification motion.

So that looked to the motion, but the couple of cases that I found looking at discovery on class and subclasses looked at

what had been identified.

If I order production of information under Request #2, isn't that going to allow you to identify these subclasses on your own?

MR. SOUMILAS: So, the answer to that question, Your Honor, is yes. I also think that we have two classes pled in the amended class action complaint, a facially-inaccurate record class and a confirmed non-match class. I think the data that we're looking for in Interrogatories 16 and 17, and also Document Request 2, is clearly within the definition of (a), facially inaccurate. There's — this is not a different class, a different theory. I don't even know that I would call it a subclass, Your Honor. It's just a question of, at the time of certification, what exactly are going to be the criteria so class members could objectively determine whether they're in or out. And I think a date of birth could be one of those criteria. It doesn't need to be in the definition, Your Honor.

So I would just take -- I think the cases that Your Honor has cited, we did not provide, but they don't sound at all inconsistent with my understanding, which is that you could take discovery that will formulate and identify the people in your class. We think 16 and 17 will identify people in the facially-inaccurate records class. And so will Document Request #2.

THE COURT: Isn't some of this information already going to be provided in response to the other discovery requests? Because if I'm looking at proportionality, which I am required to do sua sponte, if you're already getting this information, then why do you need it separate -- a separate number? If you're getting the underlying data, which is something that you told me you wanted in your portion of the joint submission, then why are these numbers specifically needed?

MR. SOUMILAS: Yeah. So, Your Honor, that's an excellent question, which begs the issue, I mean, why we're here today. Because if they're willing to answer 15 and they had given us this data two weeks ago and it adds up to our experience and what we project, we probably wouldn't be here at all.

The concern that I have is that we're going to get an answer to 15 two weeks from now and it's going to say something like it said before: None. Or, One. And that makes no sense whatsoever, and I cannot prosecute this case with just a bare answer like that.

That's why we took, you know, a couple of bites at the apple. Let's look at the date of birth information. Let's look at the records themselves. And we've talked for weeks as to, is it appropriate to narrow the request for records or to put more protections in place for privacy? We have no

interest in people's Social Security numbers or other private information. We just want to see whether public criminal records match the identities of people for whom they've already sold third-party reports. So, Your Honor, our view on this is that it depends. It depends. If 15 gives us that answer, then we might not need very much more. I just don't know because we haven't been able to get it for literally months.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, we'll -- we'll provide that response to 15. I mean, and if what I'm hearing from Mr. Soumilas is that if we respond to the interrogatories, I mean, including 16 or 17, then that would terminate the issue, we would be willing to compromise in that regard. In fact, it's something we had in connection with the meet-and-confer, but it was withdrawn.

And we do think that 16 and 17 are not subsets. In fact, they don't -- they're not even coext... they have no relation to the class that's pled in the complaint, which is defined by a name. But if that is -- if that short-circuits this issue, to provide the interrogatories, to have them verified, to make the verifying witness go under a deposition for her sworn testimony, and to modify the schedules -- we have no intention of jamming them on a schedule; we just stipulated and Judge Boyle entered a stipulation giving us more time while we work these issues -- there's nothing further to discuss and we can

just resolve this.

I'm hearing a slightly different position today than we did in the meet-and-confer. But if it's the interrogatories that they want, more time, and a deposition of the verifying witness, we'll do it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm -- we're not here on a deposition. I did not see anything about compelling a deposition.

MR. ST. GEORGE: There is nothing to compel. Right.

THE COURT: All right. So I'm not clear on what it is that you're saying on 16 and 17. Are you saying you're -- you're willing to answer these?

MR. ST. GEORGE: If that's -- if that is the compromise position, that we will remove our objections to 16. We -- we're not objecting to 15, which is the relevant interrogatory. If we respond to 16 and 17, we verify them, we provide them the substantive responses, and we make that witness available for a deposition in short order but adjust the schedule accordingly, and that resolves the pending motion to compel, then we will do that.

THE COURT: Well, so you're saying you'll answ... I'm not sure. You're --

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes, we'll --

THE COURT: What I hear you saying is --

MR. ST. GEORGE: We will --

THE COURT: -- you'll answer 16 and 17 if you don't have to provide --

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right. If it's the underlying data. So the requests for production essentially fall away, we provide the interrogatories, we verify them, we make a witness available for a deposition, and that resolves the motion to compel today, with the Plaintiffs reserving their rights if somehow the witness isn't knowledgeable or what have you. If that's the position that we're willing to enter into today, then we'll do that.

Otherwise, we think we have a very principled position that 16 and 17 don't relate to the class definition. You've heard an outdated quotation of Rule 26. Likely to lead to admissible evidence. It was amended. That's not the standard.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Claims or defenses' relevance, which is why the 2018 cases you've cited hold that way.

I'll also note we're here on our third complaint already in this case, with shifting class definitions each time. So this is not like we're at the beginning of this case and have our first complaint and we're hearing a new theory.

But, as I've mentioned, compromise. We'll move on. The parties will resolve this motion to compel. That's what I believe I'm hearing from Plaintiff's counsel, and I think

that's the most efficient way to proceed.

MR. SOUMILAS: So, Your Honor, looking at our position, has been this for weeks, which is: If they answered all the interrogatories, we don't need the documents. I think we could get the answers one way or the other.

The difficulty has been is that they have not answered Interrogatories 15, 16, or 17 to date. So if the position today is they will give meaningful answers -- not "None" or "We can't get to it" -- and then we'll have an opportunity, which is not before the Court as a motion to compel because it's not there yet, but I hear Counsel offering a witness to vet those answers, I think that's a reasonable position and we don't need the production of tons of documents if interrogatories will provide those answers. We'd rather do it that way.

But just the concern that I have is that I haven't seen it yet and I'm a little hesitant about just, you know, agreeing to that without knowing what's in the box. But I think that's a reasonable compromise. We need either the data or the answers to interrogatories, because we're looking, at the end of the day, for the same thing, which is just to identify these people who don't have criminal records and who had them on their reports.

So we could do it one way or the other.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, I might suggest,

appending to your thoughts, that we set a deadline for a response, we then set a status report or a -- I don't know how Your Honor would typically handle these things, a conference call or a joint submission to advise the Court, you know, within ten days after that to schedule the deposition. If there are any issues with the substance of the responses, we'll highlight them.

My strong suspicion is that the status report will say that the parties have provided the information, the deposition is being scheduled, and there's nothing for the Court to do at that time.

THE COURT: Well, I don't find status reports to be that beneficial. And --

MR. ST. GEORGE: However you -- however --

THE COURT: -- it's an extra step for --

MR. ST. GEORGE: -- you want to handle it.

THE COURT: -- the parties and their clients who bear the costs.

In a normal case, I would say produce -- I would order production within 14 days. This is a class action, so I understand that you may need a little longer. You said you would be ready to produce next week on 15.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right.

THE COURT: How long do you need to produce on 16 and 17?

MR. ST. GEORGE: You know, if we can have an extra week, maybe.

And if, Your Honor, if it's just as -- if it's just as well, you know, if we're entering into this compromise position, maybe we could -- if we could agree to 15 within two weeks, because I know that that's in process, and if we'd agree to 16 and 17 within three weeks, that would be agreeable to us.

And obviously, we're happy to accommodate the schedule. I know that the Plaintiff's counsel had a deadline, for instance, for expert disclosures relating to class certification. We are happy to accommodate that as well, as we always are in this case. There's no intention to jam anyone.

THE COURT: All right. So, 14 days for 15, and 21 days for 16 and 17?

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes.

THE COURT: And then, once you get that -- is that sufficiently soon enough?

MR. SOUMILAS: That seems reasonable, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. And then if there are issues with the production, then you can file another motion. You know, Rule 37 provides for progressive motions. And once there is an order, if you're contending that they failed to

comply with the order, then you move -- you move for sanctions for failing to comply with the order.

All right. So, given their agreement to respond to 16 and 17 substantively within 21 days, that moots the motion as to Request #2?

MR. SOUMILAS: So, I think -- I think so, Your Honor, with the caveat that the Court just made, that if they don't fully comply with what they just promised, we might need to be back here. But I suspect we will not be.

THE COURT: All right. All right. So, on the extension of time, that's really -- that's Judge Boyle's scheduling order, but I understand that you've already stipulated -- I think she typically allows you to stipulate to extensions, as long as it doesn't push the big deadlines. So, is this one that the parties can stipulate to?

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes, I believe so. So, we're operating within a fairly extended overall discovery period, and the last stipulation was a 30-day extension. It didn't affect the overall discovery period, because this all relates to class certification. Judge Boyle entered it the next day, I believe, without any consultation.

So we're happy to work together to do a stipulation. I understand that that is the district judge's prerogative, whether or not to do that. But I would hope and expect, as long as we are -- especially in view of this production

timeline, that I don't think it would be an issue. And we've never had any issues working out dates.

THE COURT: What I typically do is order the production even if it -- if the production will occur outside of the deadline, without otherwise disturbing the deadline.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Okay.

THE COURT: So that the district --

MR. ST. GEORGE: We'll --

THE COURT: It still remains the district judge's deadline, --

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right.

THE COURT: -- but I can say, you know, I -- you have to produce this, but it has to be produced by this date, even though it's past the deadline.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right. Okay. And we'll -- I'm sure we can get a stipulation on file this week for the judge.

THE COURT: All right. So, motion to compel has been resolved by agreement of the parties, and I will order production of the response to Interrogatory 15 within 14 days from today. And the relevance objection is withdrawn. That's the only one that was briefed. And so I'll order production as to Interrogatories 16 and 17 within 21 days of today's date. And I always add "unless otherwise agreed by the parties" to give you flexibility if anything comes up --

MR. ST. GEORGE: Okay.

THE COURT: -- for whatever reason. But it has to be a joint agreement.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Okay.

THE COURT: And then the parties will stipulate on any extension. And the motion is deemed moot as to #2, Request #2. All right.

I didn't see an issue over fees or anything, so there's nothing left to resolve. Is that correct? You weren't asking for fees?

MR. SOUMILAS: That is correct, Your Honor. There is nothing left to resolve for -- from our perspective today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Same here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. If there are any future discovery disputes that I will be addressing, I will be going through them request by request unless they're grouped together. Sometimes the objections are the same and we can group some together. And I will be addressing the objections that are in the joint submission, and I'll be looking for case law from both sides to help me get through it more quickly.

MR. SOUMILAS: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much. Good luck to both sides. We are adjourned.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Thank you.

MR. SOUMILAS: Thank you.

Date

Kathy Rehling, CETD-444

Certified Electronic Court Transcriber

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